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Social dimensions of the novel coronavirus (nCoV) outbreak and response: 
meeting report 
Roundtable at the Wellcome Trust, London, 3rd February 2020 
Roundtable objectives 
 To discuss appropriate social science and humanities inputs that can improve understanding of the 
outbreak in global terms, including the response in China, Asia and around the world. 
 To identify social science evidence needs and modes of engagement with policymakers and 
practitioners that could inform preparedness and response over the next period. 
 To foster mutual learning amongst social scientists and historians working in China and other settings 
about how our perspectives can most appropriately contribute. 
The meeting was organised around three thematic areas: 
1) The social contexts and dynamics of transmission and spread 
2) Public health responses 
3) Communication and messaging 
 
Understanding the social contexts and dynamics of transmission and spread 
The discussion centred on the ecological, social, political and economic dynamics of the outbreak, starting 
with the zoonotic spillover of the virus, the relevant aspects of the Chinese context as well as the broader 
global setting. Priority areas for discussion included movement and migration of people, livelihoods, trade 
and investment, health-seeking practices and the geopolitical context of the epidemic. Meeting participants 
identified potential areas where social science evidence could contribute to the response, in tandem with 
medical and epidemiological knowledge. Social science contributions identified were those related to 
understanding the diversity of local contexts and social systems, and the significance of social differences 
that might impact on disease occurrence (such as economic and migration status, and access to health care). 
The themes that emerged were: 
The nCoV outbreak in the global arena 
 Geopolitical shifts have occurred since the SARS outbreak in 2003 which need to be taken into 
account in relation to considering the unfolding of the outbreak globally and responses to it. China 
has also correspondingly come to occupy a different position in the Global Public Health arena and 
within the WHO.  
 Mobility and communication have expanded in the past decades, with initiatives such as the Belt and 
Road increasing connectivity between China and countries in south-east Asia and Africa. The 
increased connectedness of China is significant - students, businesspeople and other professionals 
travel frequently within China and globally. 
 The Chinese interventions can be viewed as a response to an emerging caseload, but also as 
representative of pressure on the government to demonstrate a confident and effective response to 
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both Chinese and Global Public Health audiences. China has been positioned by commentators as 
influential within WHO and there is speculation as to whether the current response will come to be 
viewed as an effective model for future epidemic response plans. Social science analysis is key to 
assessing the response, including any unintended consequences. The potential contributions that a 
strong and effective civil society can make to the community should be explored.  
 Participants discussed the political and economic factors that can influence the framing of a public 
health threat and who might determine what constitutes such a threat. The group discussed the 
question of how such a decision is made, the current state of global governance and the different 
degrees of compliance with the International Health Regulations. Expert commentary on the outbreak 
has been of the opinion that preparedness mechanisms are stronger globally. The current global 
tension between the United States and China also received attention in terms of the extent to which 
this has been influential in the response so far, and how it might influence the next period of response.  
 Participants discussed that, since the time of the SARS outbreak, there has been a process of 
centralisation of health care services and resources in China, accompanied by rapid urbanisation and 
the phenomenon of the megacity. Participants were of the view that this urbanisation, and reforms in 
health insurance, have changed health seeking. People in China are now more drawn to seek 
services in the cities and at hospitals for minor health issues, and the grassroots services and home 
remedies – both biomedical and Chinese – might be less relevant than before. Health insurance policy 
encourages people to go to grassroots level health facilities by giving higher reimbursement 
proportions for health care services provided by lower level health facilities – however, this is not 
strictly enforced and people gravitate to higher level hospitals. This raises the question of how many 
people will rely on self-management at home in the current situation of this outbreak, and how many 
will seek treatment in these centralised facilities. In this crisis, people may revert to more traditional 
forms of health care as formal services come under increasing pressure. Several factors are likely to 
shape these decisions as the epidemic unfolds. 
 Participants reflected on the differences between the Chinese government’s approach to SARS where 
research showed that migrant workers in particular were identified as a target group for interventions, 
with some deleterious consequences. It appears that the approach for nCoV is to direct measures at 
a much broader demographic. 
 In the longer term, it is important to consider the large scale shifts that can be seen in China (and in 
other parts of the world) towards increasing proportions of the population living in very large cities. 
Research is currently underway that focuses on the complexity of these shifts, with reference to public 
health risks that can emerge, alongside health benefits.  
 A related set of shifts concern diet, with increased demand for animal protein (again both in China, 
and other countries). The particularities of Chinese dietary preferences and shifts have been the 
subject of research, as has been the importance of wet markets (some also trading live and wild 
animals) in socio-cultural life and as a source of fresh food. Important longer-term research agendas 
concern the relationships between zoonotic spillover, meat consumption and health risks, and the 
many and sensitive social and livelihood implications involved. In the case of nCoV, these need to be 
informed also by focused understanding of which animal(s) are implicated both in the origins of the 
outbreak in a food market in Wuhan, and in possible viral transmission. Currently there are major 
scientific uncertainties, and there is evidence that responses such as blanket bans on wet markets 
and other wild animal trade create a series of negative social consequences.  
Identifying vulnerable populations in terms of public reactions and susceptibility to infection 
 Chinese people and culture have been targeted by prejudice, racism and discrimination, as witnessed 
in incidents and media coverage in other countries. Such negative reactions are likely to also be 
related to pre-existing anxieties amongst local populations in various settings about the increased 
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global presence of China and growing Chinese economic influence. These can fuel prejudice in the 
current context of fear about an outbreak of nCoV.  
 Historical and social science work around previous epidemics shows that epidemics can exacerbate 
the scapegoating and discrimination of particular social groups. Likewise, stigma and discrimination 
in an epidemic setting is often rooted in broader historical experiences.  
 Understanding the social dynamics of localities at risk of infection will assist in identifying populations 
that might be particularly vulnerable in the case of nCoV outbreak. Axes of social and economic 
vulnerability are as important to consider as the factors that make certain groups biologically 
vulnerable to infection. Marginalised groups at risk (due to factors such as poor access to health care 
or migration status) can be identified in advance and engaged in preparedness plans.  
 As in other epidemics, health workers can be stigmatised. They will have particular understandings 
of the epidemic, attitudes towards different social groups attending services, and opinions about the 
adequacy of responses, as well as government measures to provide them with suitable resources 
and protection. These need to be taken into account as their commitment is crucial to an effective 
response. 
Gauging social diversity and politics across different scales 
 With reference to China, participants discussed the different scales of organisation that need to be 
considered. In the context of the movement restrictions within and between cities, individual 
households have become important – here different intergenerational responses to the epidemic 
manifest, and intergenerational dynamics of care will come into play. However, there are also other 
‘units of analysis’ to consider, for example, gated communities in China have become very important 
in the social organisation of residents, and also have relevance for state monitoring of the population. 
The relevant scales (household, collective housing, the gated community, the street and so on) need 
to be identified in each context. 
 To adequately understand the response in China, there needs to be a nuanced understanding of 
internal politics at relevant levels. The Politburo is in charge of the response that combines the 
activities of many sectors, yet there is also potential competition with local party sections. It is 
important to understand the dynamics of the response, including the interactions and interests from 
provincial and central governments, and the different units of public health response agencies such 
as the China CDC. 
 
Public health responses  
The roundtable discussed the social, economic and livelihood implications of quarantine, screening and other 
nCoV related public health responses, within China and beyond. The group also explored the implications of 
societal understandings of disease and risk, and health-seeking behaviour in the context of outbreaks. This 
discussion covered healthcare resources, and the questions about preparedness and response in other 
regions beyond China, including Africa, where capacities and political dynamics would be different. Public 
responses to outbreak-related health interventions was a further focus, including social trust and stigma.  
Health care systems, preparedness and under/overreactions 
 Historians emphasised the importance of understanding how an epidemic response by government, 
and the public reaction to it, is shaped by previous experiences of crises as well as imaginaries of 
historical epidemic events. The group discussed the influence, in this nCoV case, of SARS, but also 
H1N1 and the 1918 influenza epidemic. It might be of relevance that the response to the H1N1 
epidemic has been retrospectively assessed as an overreaction, given that this nCoV outbreak is 
drawing comment that it might be more akin to H1N1 than SARS in a number of respects. Participants 
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discussed whether, amongst certain global and national actors, the nCoV outbreak is being viewed 
as a kind of ‘dry run’ for preparedness for a future big ‘disease X’ – a potential event involving both 
rapid spread and fatality rates higher than seen (at least so far) for nCoV. More broadly, the history 
and politics of ‘global health security’ policy and debates is clearly relevant to understanding the 
unfolding response to nCoV.  
 Participants discussed the fact that the response of the Chinese government has drawn comment 
because of the extreme measures seen as ‘draconian’ by some, with concern about the level of 
surveillance and the militarised nature of the operations; others noted that the measures may foster 
trust in the government’s commitment to the response. Historians pointed to past examples of how 
extreme controls can have unintended consequences as people attempt to circumvent measures, or 
are simply unable to follow them given urgent social and livelihood pressures. The group discussed 
whether a more measured and consensual approach could also be effective, with attention to the 
tension between public health concerns and individual rights.  
 Participants discussed whether the current response will influence future discourses about global 
preparedness and response, and shape understandings and systems of preparedness. The 
consensus was that social science and historical perspectives should also be considered before any 
such shifts are made. Social and historical evidence and ongoing research can contribute to pointing 
to the inequalities that can be intensified in the case of severe quarantine measures, given that these 
can affect certain sectors of a population and certain vulnerable groups to a greater extent.  
 The nCoV situation in China will give insights into the roll-out of preparedness plans elsewhere. The 
response to nCoV will be unusual in terms of large-scale quarantining, and (allegedly) the plans for 
rapid production of vaccines. There will be a need to assess the replicability of these practices in 
different social contexts and countries, with different health and other resources, and with different 
political systems and expectations about the relationship between citizens and the state.    
 Past outbreaks have demonstrated that the strength of the primary health care system will shape the 
impact of the disease. This includes not just the system’s resources and capacities, but, importantly 
the extent to which systems are used and trusted by (different) local population groups. There needs 
to be further understanding of how these system/trust relationships are unfolding in the Chinese 
context. But critically, there are important questions about the possible impact of the epidemic in 
countries with far weaker health systems, or where use and trust have been undermined by conflict, 
inequality and socio-political change. 
 
‘Unforeseen’ consequences of epidemic response activities  
 Different approaches to quarantining and isolation that are being taken in China compared with other 
countries warrant attention in terms of their social (and health) consequences. The encouragement 
of treatment in hospitals or quarantining of international travellers from China, contrast with 
approaches (such as used for seasonal influenza, or in the nCoV public health guidance of some 
countries) focused on keeping people dispersed, via messages to ‘stay home’ or contact a health 
helpline.  
 There is extensive experience of the effects of non-pharmaceutical measures such as quarantining 
in different historical periods and contexts. There are historic examples of non-compliance, resistance, 
violation of human rights, and questions over public health effectiveness, particularly in the case of 
large-scale quarantining. There are also challenges associated with taking care of the needs of people 
in isolation. In the current outbreak in China, participants cited examples of unforeseen reactions like 
vigilante groups building barricades around villages, and of isolated and vulnerable people not 
receiving adequate care (as in an example of a disabled child whose father had been quarantined). 
Questions concern how to keep public health interests at heart whilst mitigating such negative effects. 
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There are difficult balances which may be interpreted differently in particular social settings, such as 
with respect to the salience of individual or collective rights, or the treatment of vulnerable groups.  
 Negative experiences of response activities might lead to future effects with negative health impacts, 
beyond nCoV. For instance, people’s fear or distrust of public health activities in the context of an 
outbreak may undermine their use of health services in future, for different conditions. Or if a particular 
person is stigmatised in the context of nCoV – for instance as a potential transmissor – this could 
undermine their future relationship with health care practitioners.  
 Participants raised issues around the major economic impact of public health and quarantining 
measures. These range from the economic impact of isolating major commercial hubs, which is being 
felt nationally and globally, as well as the impact on small businesses or livelihoods dependent on 
movement such as pastoralism or marketing. There is a need for research on such socio-economic 
impacts and implications – in China and in other countries – and their differential effects on different 
population groups. This could in turn inform the design of appropriate measures and forms of 
mitigation/compensation. 
 Participants shared evidence on the measures to ban wet markets and wild animal trade and 
consumption, which have been discussed in other countries, and highlighted in foreign media. The 
case for a blanket ban is very weak given the uncertainty and specificity of which animal(s) are 
implicated in viral spillover and transmission. Moreover ‘wet markets’ is a very diverse category that 
encompasses different kinds of markets, and, in the case of China, these are well regulated and 
inspected. Participants suggested that better regulation is a better option than bans, which will have 
consequences for the livelihoods and food security of traders and consumers; there is also experience 
in different contexts (including China) of bans causing trading practices to go underground, and thus 
outside public health supervision. 
 
Communication and messaging 
Here we explored diverse understandings of the outbreak, and of risks and uncertainties. We appraised 
information-sharing through official and unofficial channels and drew on perspectives and lessons from past 
outbreaks globally.  
Evolving perceptions of the disease and the response 
 Participants reflected on that fact that, in China, when the number of cases increased and spread 
beyond Wuhan, most people appear to have followed the recommendations of the authorities, 
cancelling family gatherings and travel and staying at home. There was a view that young people are 
more likely to comply with these state directives than the older generation, possibly due to greater 
internet connectivity. 
 According to a 25th January survey in China, there were significant demographic differences in 
people’s attitudes to the unfolding outbreak, and their attention to and use of different information 
sources. Key findings include that higher levels of education meant more attention was paid to the 
outbreak, and to government statistics. There is high use of social media as an information source – 
notably Weixin (similar to Whatsapp), and Weibo (like Twitter), and conventional media such as 
television. The high importance of social media particularly for young people was noted. Less is known 
about how people not digitally connected – such as people living in remote rural areas – have been 
gaining information and whether they rely on traditional forms of media; although such groups may 
be small today, this remains an important research question.  
 Social media has played a major role in the social response to the epidemic, making particular 
departments of government accountable and raising important research questions. Participants 
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discussed the potential of using social media analysis to (i) appraise what is happening to different 
communities’ relationship with the response, and (ii) to try and influence or support the response. 
 The State institutions are heavily invested in social media, with local and central government, 
hospitals, and China CDCs, all having Weibo accounts. These are all monitored. They offer two-way 
communication with the public. 
 UN agencies are tracking social media as part of the RCCE strategy (IFRC, WHO, UNICEF, CDC). 
 There is a view that initially the online community in China was subject to less state involvement. The 
group discussed that Chinese authorities have taken a strict approach to ‘rumours’- with bans and 
investigation of certain people who are considered to be communicating rumours about the disease, 
including some who revealed the epidemic at the early stage. Participants discussed an evident shift, 
namely that messages emerging from local and national media have, a few weeks into the response, 
been streamlined to communicate facts, figures and the messages approved by the State. There is a 
question as to whether this streamlining of messages has been a part of the preparedness plans. 
 A large proportion of people – 70% (survey on the 25th of Jan) perceive that the government can 
handle the situation, thinking the outbreak will be contained in 2-3 months. 
Masks and other communication challenges 
 The group discussed the observation that there has been panic buying in China and globally of 
surgical masks. In this regard, it is important to consider if messaging around masks has been 
diverting attention from more life-saving behaviours such as frequent handwashing. It was also noted 
that masks and their use have different meanings in different country contexts. In Asian contexts, 
mask-wearing is considered a responsible act and is common practice. In China, the wearing of 
masks has been recommended by experts and has now become compulsory in public places. 
Participants discussed the debates regarding the efficacy of masks and whether masks come to act 
as a talisman to some extent, enabling people to go on with their lives whilst having a feeling of being 
protected. The majority of people who participated in the survey in China in January, believed in the 
usefulness of masks. They are used by the majority of people outdoors and a minority use them 
indoors.  
 Participants discussed that social media monitoring suggests that there are some rumours and 
misconceptions about treatments for nCoV being shared in China e.g. people are recommending 
treatments that they think would work with the ‘common cold’, such as salted water and Vitamin C. 
 Participants were of the consensus that, with this level of uncertainty, the boundary between ‘rumours’ 
and ‘real’ facts becomes blurred; many people are speculating, and indeed speculation may be seen 
as a rational response to uncertainty and ambiguity. Participants – drawing on history and social 
sciences – underlined that rumours are also expressions of broader anxieties, which have historical 
and social logics rooted in past experience, and that it is important to identify these if ‘rumours’ and 
their roles are to be understood, and trust built. A response based on the idea of rumours as 
‘misperceptions’ which can be addressed with ‘accurate information’ will often be misplaced and might 
serve to undermine trust.  
Creating feedback mechanisms between the response and ‘the communities’ 
 Participants discussed how media monitoring and other methods to gather a range of perspectives 
from the population, can be harnessed in order to create a dialogue between those affected on the 
ground, and other agencies. If fear, anxieties and ‘rumours’ are understood as legitimate responses 
and people are engaged in dialogue rather than punished, the information could assist in adjusting 
the public health response and the activities and messaging of agencies. The group discussed the 
importance of activating such an information loop for meaningful, transparent and accountable 
community engagement. 
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There is wide scope to support the response through: 
(i) Synthesising existing contextual and historical experiences to inform the appropriateness of 
particular public health interventions in China and contexts where the disease could spread.  
(ii) Conveying the local contextual realities of the cities, regions and social groups affected or 
potentially affected by the epidemic, in order to ensure that preparedness and response are 
adapted to local circumstances and do not produce unplanned negative consequences.  
(iii) Tracking and following the nCoV epidemic and response from a social science angle to see 
what insights come from new interventions in this socio-historical context (e.g. large scale 
quarantining in megacities).  
(iv) Tracking media and public perceptions of the disease and response in real time to shape not 
only communications, but also responses across all interventions.  
Outputs and challenges 
Participants discussed that the audiences for the research outputs need to be determined accurately. It is 
less likely that research briefings will shape Chinese government policy as it is currently being implemented 
but they are of relevance to the international response. When looking further afield in countries were the 
disease might spread, it is important to identify who the audiences will be and what contribution is most 
needed. Participants discussed the difficulties of conducting research in China by foreign social scientists, 
especially in a time of national crisis. It is important to appraise what research is currently possible and 
taking place in China.  
With these caveats in mind, the following areas for research were identified in the roundtable: 
 Exploring community-level feedback, rumours and ‘misinformation’, and assessing the best methods 
to track and synthesise these, and to harness findings to better inform responses in an effective 
feedback loop.   
 Understanding how geopolitics affects the governance of public health and public health responses. 
 Understanding how the imaginaries of previous crisis and epidemics shape the response in different 
contexts.  
 Understanding how key actors frame what constitutes a global health crisis and how such a decision 
is made. 
 Understanding how different actors deal with uncertainty. 
 Synthesising evidence to consider how an outbreak might be managed in places that are less 
‘prepared’ and resourced than China. 
 Learning from previous epidemics (and the ongoing one as it unfolds) regarding the effectiveness of 
different kinds of quarantining, social isolation and detection measures, and how these interact with 
the local political economies. 
 Identifying the role of civil society in enabling different kinds of public health responses.  
 Synthesising existing research on the implications of banning ‘wet markets’, and advocating for better 
regulation in order to avoid trade going underground.  
 Understanding what evidence in used in decisions to restrict travel and trade and what factors 
influence these decisions. 
 With outbreaks, the ‘mover’ is as much governments as the virus. Thus investigating the impact of 
the disruption that the response itself generates is an important area. 
 Identifying ‘fault lines’ between social groups that might widen in outbreaks - this can be done in 
advance of the epidemic to foresee stigma and discrimination, and to engage with marginalised 
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groups during preparedness plans. Methods include context analysis and rapid ethnographic 
fieldwork, identifying health seeking practices and identifying other relevant socio-cultural practices. 
 Identifying how social cohesion manifests, and what factors might build or erode social trust in 
different settings. 
 Understanding local forms of resilience vis-à-vis the impact of the disease and the activities of the 
response. 
 Understanding stigma and how it comes to build up and manifest in different ways in particular 
settings, and how this should inform preparedness plans. 
 Identifying the lessons to be learnt from a public health intervention in a large city in a significant crisis, 
and what elements are relevant to other contexts with different political economies. 
 Identifying the lessons learned for future epidemic preparedness, and how to balance preparation 
with measured responses. Analysis is necessary to see how the current outbreak might shape 
understandings and discourses of preparedness. Social scientists should engage in order to feed in 
critical insights related to the effects of public health responses. 
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